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A VOIR DIRE OF VOIR DIRE: LISTENING TO JURORS'
VIEWS REGARDING THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
MARY R. RoSE*
INTRODUCION
Jury selection in the United States involves a unique set of prac-
tices.1 Although varying to some extent across states and jurisdic-
tions, 2 jury selection procedures have the following in common: (1) a
questioning process (called the "voir dire"),3 which allows the judge
and attorneys to collect information from jurors about potential
biases; (2) challenges for cause, in which a judge can excuse anyone
who possesses characteristics or attitudes that demonstrate that the
juror cannot be fair;4 and, (3) a set of peremptory challenges, which
* Assistant Professor of Sociology and Law, University of Texas at Austin. The author
gratefully acknowledges the American Bar Foundation for providing protected time to develop
this research. In addition, valuable help on this project came from Neil Vidmar, Shari S.
Diamond, Karla Fischer, Allen Lind, Karen Cook, and Susan Roth, as well as from my research
assistants, Jim Clark, and the very diligent Ernest Gurule.
1. WORLD JURY SYSTEMS 33 (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000) ("The law in the United States
stands almost alone in taking practical cognizance of all forms of bias through pretrial
questioning of jurors by judge or judge and opposing counsel.").
2. Jurisdictions can vary in whether they use a "sequential method" of exercising
challenges, in which case one side exercises peremptories before the other does, versus a "strike
method," in which both sides exercise challenges at the same time. See Gordon Bermant &
John Shapard, The Voir Dire Examination, Juror Challenges, and Adversarial Advocacy, in THE
TRIAL PROCESS 69, 81, 92-93 (Bruce D. Sales ed., 1981). Federal and state courts typically
differ in whether attorneys (state courts) or the judge (federal courts) conduct the majority of
questioning. See, e.g., GORDON BERMANT, CONDUCr OF THE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
(1977). Jurisdictions also differ in how many peremptories they allow. See JURY TRIAL
INNOVATIONS 231 (G. Thomas Munsterman et al. eds., 1997).
3. Zeisel and Diamond note that "voir dire is sometimes translated from the French as
,see [them] talk,' but in fact means 'true talk,' the word voir being a corruption of the Latin
verus, or 'true'." Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges
on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 491 n.1
(1978).
4. For example, a juror may have a serious conflict of interest in a given case, such as
being related to one of the parties through blood. People may also show actual bias by
possessing an inability or unwillingness to remain fair and impartial. In all instances, challenges
for cause are granted because of a "narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis for
partiality." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
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allow parties to dismiss a limited number of prospective jurors
without providing any explanations.' Although all these practices are
subject to some level of analysis and criticism, 6 the peremptory
challenge is by far the most controversial aspect of U.S. jury selection
practices.
7
The peremptory challenge does indeed offer several sources of
concern. Empirical research on jury selection in criminal cases
demonstrates the continued use of race in the exercise of peremptory
challenges. 8 Many have lamented the seeming inability of Batson9
and its progeny 10 to remedy discriminatory practices,1 and one critic
5. Id. (". . . [Tihe peremptory permits rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is less
easily designated or demonstrable.").
6. The questioning process, for example, raises issues of privacy protection. See, e.g.,
Michael R. Glover, The Right to Privacy of Prospective Jurors During Voir Dire, 70 CAL. L.
REV. 709 (1982); Paula L. Hannaford, Safeguarding Juror Privacy: A New Framework for Court
Policies and Procedures, 85 JUDICATURE 18 (2001); Paul Lynd, Juror Sexual Orientation: The
Fair Cross-Section Requirement, Privacy, Challenges for Cause, and Peremptories, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 231 (1998); Mary R. Rose, Expectations of Privacy? Jurors' Views of Voir Dire Questions,
85 JUDICATURE 10 (2001); David Weinstein, Protecting a Juror's Right to Privacy: Constitu-
tional Constraints and Policy Options, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (1997). The challenge for cause has
received remarkably little scholarly attention, although even critics of the peremptory
acknowledge that the challenge for cause can be "unrealistically narrow, both as defined and as
applied." Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and
Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 486 (1996).
7. See infra notes 8-32 and accompanying text. An extensive compilation of the
numerous law review writings on the peremptory appears in Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory
Challenges Should be Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 809-10
n.1-2 (1997). For additional writing since the time of that publication, see William G. Childs,
The Intersection of Peremptory Challenges, Challenges for Cause, and Harmless Error, 27 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 49 (1999); Vivien Toomey Montz & Craig Lee Montz, The Peremptory Challenge:
Should it Still Exist? An Examination of Federal and Florida Law, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 451
(2000); Arielle Siebert, Batson v Kentucky: Application to Whites and the Effect on the
Peremptory Challenge System, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 307 (1999); Coburn R. Beck,
Note, The Current State of the Peremptory Challenge, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 961 (1998).
8. JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 158-59 (1977); David C. Baldus et
al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis,
3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3 (2001); Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Redefining the Role of the Jury:
Realistic Responses to the Limitations of Batson v. Kentucky, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 77
(1997); Mary R. Rose, The Peremptory Challenge Accused of Race or Gender Discrimination?
Some Data from One County, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 695 (1999); Bruce J. Winick, Prosecuto-
rial Peremptory Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1982).
9. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
10. J.E.B. v. Alabama, ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42
(1992); Edmonstron v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400 (1991).
11. See, e.g., Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the
Jury, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1123 (1995) ("[Tihe way in which Batson has been put into practice
has allowed race-based, and will now allow gender-based, peremptories to continue .. ");
Melilli, supra note 6, at 503 ("This death knell [of the peremptory] was not sounded because
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refers to the peremptory simply as the "last best tool of Jim Crow.' 2
Apart from utilizing stereotypes based upon race or gender-which
the Supreme Court has addressed' 3-some see the peremptory as
encouraging decision making based upon unfounded assumptions
about many other types of groups.' 4 During jury selection prospective
jurors may be asked about the organizations to which they belong,"5
the media they consume,' 6 and a host of other factors that potentially
bear little relationship to how they will ultimately view a criminal
case. 7 Critics express a strong distaste for using these or other
stereotypes to make decisions, rather than treating and evaluating
people as individuals who likely hold a complex range of views.1s
Finally, the peremptory is believed to squander human capital by
dismissing from juries people who may be able to serve as well or
better than the people who replaced them.19 The little empirical
research available does indeed show that attorneys are poor at
assessing bias and predicting its effects.2 0 In addition, attorneys are
accused of overusing peremptory challenges simply to preserve for
Batson has effectively circumscribed race- and gender-based peremptory challenges; toward that
end, Batson is almost surely a failure."); Jere M. Morehead, When a Peremptory Challenge Is No
Longer Peremptory: Batson's Unfortunate Failure To Eradicate Invidious Discrimination from
Jury Selection, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 625 (1994).
12. Hoffman, supra note 7, at 827.
13. See supra notes 9-10.
14. See, e.g., Cheryl G. Bader, Batson Meets the First Amendment: Prohibiting Peremptory
Challenges That Violate a Prospective Juror's Speech and Association Rights, 24 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 567 (1996).
15. See, e.g., Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 354 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
16. Id.
17. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Scientific Jury Selection: What Social Scientists Know and
Do Not Know, 73 JUDICATURE 178 (1990) (reviewing evidence that the information contained
in profiles of jurors does not predict verdict preferences).
18. See, e.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY (1994) (arguing that jurors should not
be expected to "represent" a particular group on the jury); Raymond J. Broderick, Why the
Peremptory Challenge Should be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 369, 415 (1992) (explaining that
social scientific jury selection techniques reinforce "demeaning stereotypes"); Hoffman, supra
note 7, at 860-65 (arguing that "peremptory challenges improperly shift the focus of jury
selection from the individual to the group"); Marder, supra note 11, at 1077 ("[W]hen the
explanation [for a peremptory] is a group-based stereotype (even if unspoken), then our notion
of fairness is offended .. "); Melilli, supra note 6, at 447 ("The peremptory challenge system
allows lawyers and litigants to impose.., stereotypes upon the jury selection process without
articulating these potentially offensive and divisive prejudices.").
19. Hoffman, supra note 7, at 858 ("[P]erfectly acceptable, perfectly fair and perfectly
impartial jurors are being excluded in droves ... ").
20. See, e.g., M.O. Finkelstein & B. Levin, Clear Choices and Guesswork in Peremptory
Challenges in Federal Court, 160 J. ROYAL STAT. SoC'y 275 (1997); C. Johnson & Craig Haney,
Felony Voir Dire: An Exploratory Study of its Content and Effect, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 487
(1994); Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 3, at 528-29.
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appeal any disagreements they may have with the judge regarding
challenges for cause.
21
According to its critics, the net result of all these problems with
the peremptory is the creation of an embittered and cynical group of
former jurors.22 In this view, whether selected or not, people who
observe modern jury selection practices are expected to shake their
heads in disgust as they watch a spectacle of adversarial, self-
interested parties pass judgment on the fairness and impartiality of
ordinary citizens. Some believe the excused to be especially resentful:
I cannot count the number of times I have seen prospective jurors
flash me a look of betrayal when, after they have passed through
the gauntlet of challenges for cause, they have been excused per-
emptorily because of their educational level or their occupation or
the kind of car they drive. Is it any wonder that these people leave
our courtrooms thinking that the whole trial process is just as trivial
and flawed as jury selection?
23
The peremptory challenge also has its share of supporters. For-
mer Chief Justice Burger maintained that the peremptory is essential
to a fair jury selection process.2 4 Professor Barbara Babcock outlined
four functions the peremptory serves, including giving the appearance
of fairness because a litigant has control over choosing a jury;
25
leaving unstated any concerns parties might have about jurors'
biases;26 overriding jurors' natural reluctance to admit partiality;27 and
serving as a "shield for the exercise of the challenge for cause. '2s The
"shield" means that attorneys need not fear alienating a prospective
juror whom they aggressively questioned because if a challenge for
cause ultimately fails they can always remove that prospective juror
with a peremptory challenge. Nonetheless, even Professor Babcock
21. Hoffman, supra note 7, at 857 ("Lawyers have significant procedural incentive to
exercise all of their peremptory challenges: if they do not, in most jurisdictions they lose any
appellate argument regarding erroneous rulings on challenges for cause.").
22. Broderick, supra note 18, at 418 ("Failure to adhere to the mandate of equality erodes
community trust in the fairness and neutrality of our judicial system."); Marder, supra note 11,
at 1084 ("Those who witness the improper exclusion of prospective jurors based on perempto-
ries are also taught harmful lessons.... They may also conclude that there is hierarchy, rather
than equality, among citizens ... ").
23. Hoffman, supra note 7, at 861-62.
24. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 119 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
25. Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving 'Its Wonderful Power,' 27 STAN. L. REV.
545, 552 (1975).
26. Id. at 553.
27. Id. at 554.
28. Id.
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has seen fit to revisit her prior opinions, 29 and for critics, the peremp-
tory's burdensome problems far outweigh any of its alleged advan-
tages. 30  With regularity, law review articles
3 and legal opinions32
either predict or call for the demise of the peremptory challenge.
This Essay will not dispute the troubling fact that lawyers some-
times use the peremptory challenge to racially gerrymander a jury.
Empirical research has documented this practice,3 3 and indeed in my
own research I have seen it happen. 34 However, as the above litera-
ture review suggests, concerns about the peremptory are broader than
issues of gender or racial representation on juries. Fundamentally,
critics of the peremptory take issue with the injection of adversaries'
interests into jury selection by way of the challenge.35 The negative
effect of the adversarial process is not merely the composition of the
resulting jury, but also the reactions and feelings of the excused
jurors. Nevertheless, there is scant empirical evidence regarding the
effect of the peremptory on its targets-the excused jurors them-
selves. For although some worry that excused jurors see triviality in
selection decisions,36 feel unfairly treated,37 and look down on the
courts, 38 no research shows that they do. In both legal writings and
the social science literature, the documented voice and perspective of
29. Barbara Allen Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights and Jury Service, 61
U. CIN. L. REV. 1139, 1147 (1993) ("What I failed to recognize... was that, even though no
words were spoken, tides of racial passion swept through the courtroom when the peremptory
challenges were exercised.").
30. Hoffman, supra note 7, at 871 ("These costs-in juror distrust, cynicism, and preju-
dice-simply obliterate any benefits achieved by permitting trial lawyers to test their home-
grown theories of human behavior on the most precious commodities we have-impartial
citizens.").
31. Id. n.1.
32. Alen v. State, 596 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (Hubbart, J., concurring);
People v. Boiling, 591 N.E.2d 1136 (N.Y. 1992) (Bellacosa, J., concurring).
33. See sources cited supra note 8.
34. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 8, at 699 (discussing representativeness of all thirteen trials);
infra note 94 and accompanying text (providing an example of an unrepresentative jury).
35. Hoffman, supra note 7, at 865-70 (arguing that "the peremptory challenge injects an
inappropriate level of adversariness into the jury selection process").
36. Id. at 862 (observing that people leave the court thinking that the whole trial process is
"just as trivial and flawed as jury selection").
37. Id. n.218 ("[M]ost prospective jurors take their roles very seriously, at least by the time
we have reached the peremptory challenge phase, and I sense they are regularly offended when
they are excused for unexplained reasons, about which they naturally assume the worst ..
Marder, supra note 11, at 1084 ("[Tlhere is the stigma that exclusion casts ... ").
38. Broderick, supra note 18, at 418 (noting the erosion of trust in courts); Marder, supra
note 11, at 1077 (noting that when peremptories are exercised on group-based characteristics, "it
is unlikely that the community will perceive the process as fair and accept the verdict").
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the juror is absent. This is surprising since Batson and its progeny
implicate a juror's Equal Protection rights when peremptory chal-
lenges are exercised on impermissible grounds.39
As an initial step in remedying this situation, the project de-
scribed here conducted, in essence, an additional "voir dire" on jurors
who have already gone through one jury selection experience. In
interviews of over 200 former jurors,40 I asked people about jury
selection, inviting them to consider the event in terms of the social
science of procedural justice.41 The procedural justice literature looks
at distribution systems and asks questions not only about the per-
ceived fairness of what someone gets (distributive justice), but also
the fairness of how benefits and burdens are distributed (procedural
justice).42 This distinction between perceptions of outcomes versus
procedures is especially important in the context of jury selection,
which distributes a burden of citizenship. People may not necessarily
want to be selected for a jury-and in one sense, may be happy to be
excused-but, according to critics, such people may nevertheless feel
that the procedure, in particular the peremptory challenge, is flawed.
Several questions posed to jurors during the interviews allow for a
detailed examination of excused jurors' reactions to being excused, as
well as their views of the jury selection process.
The result is a more nuanced portrait of reactions to jury selec-
tion practices than what typically appears in debates about the
peremptory. In particular, evidence emerged for each of the follow-
ing:
(1) Although jurors reported that stereotyping was involved in
decisions to excuse them, these stereotypes varied in what might be
called "acceptability" and in their relationship to jurors' own assess-
39. See cases cited supra notes 9-10. Interestingly, it is the defendant who usually "speaks"
for the excluded juror in these cases through third-party standing.
40. Throughout this Paper, I use the term "juror" to refer to anyone who underwent voir
dire, irrespective of whether they were actually selected for the jury or not. This avoids the
cumbersome necessity of using phrases such as former "prospective jurors" or "venire
members" to refer to those excused.
41. For more detail on the larger project, see Mary Ruth Rose, Telling the State About
Yourself: The Procedural Justice of Jury Selection (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on
file with author).
42. For reviews, see, for example, E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER,
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1975); J. Brockner & B.M. Weisenfeld, An Integrative Framework for
Explaining Reactions to Decisions: Interactive Effects of Outcomes and Procedures, 120
PSYCHOL. BULL. 189 (1996).
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ments of their fitness to serve. In contrast to those who believed they
were dismissed because of their behavior during voir dire or because
of legally relevant experiences, those who believed they were dis-
missed on the basis of assumptions about their personal characteris-
tics were the least accepting of their outcome.
(2) Despite differences in the acceptability of rationales, the per-
ceived reasons for being excused were not associated with ratings of
being treated fairly, overall satisfaction with the jury experience, or
willingness to serve on a jury in the future.
(3) When asked to define fair treatment, both selected and ex-
cused jurors raised jury selection decision making as an issue of fair
treatment. But whereas the peremptory challenge was rarely men-
tioned as a symbol of unfairness, jurors were critical of aspects of the
challenge for cause-specifically, how the court handles hardship
cases. Jurors who described fair treatment also focused on whether
court personnel were evenhanded, respectful, and asked appropriate
questions.
In Part I, 1 describe the data source. Part II discusses how I cate-
gorized jurors' claims about why they were excused and presents the
distribution of these categories. This part also considers the ways in
which these categories are associated with jurors' beliefs about their
abilities to be fair and support for the decision to excuse them. Part
III examines whether people's suspicions about why they were
excused predict other ratings of jury selection, especially how fairly
jurors were treated. I also discuss the ways in which jurors defined
"fair treatment" during voir dire. Part IV discusses the results and
their implications. I conclude that rather than supporting the worst
fears about a public alienated by jury selection, the data are more
consistent with what has been described as a "generally accepting
attitude" toward voir dire and its practices.43 If the reactions of jurors
themselves are to justify drastic changes to jury selection, critics will
not find support among the jurors with whom I spoke.
43. Shari Seidman Diamond, What Jurors Think: Expectations and Reactions of Citizens





A. Jury Selection Practices and Trial Observation
The present study is based on interviews with 207 people who
completed jury service in thirteen criminal trials in a single North
Carolina county. Cases were selected nonrandomly from the court
calendar by choosing the most serious felony case to be tried in a
given week." However, due to the courthouse's small size, usually no
more than one serious criminal case would be tried in a given week;
thus, the cases in the sample represent a sizeable proportion of those
felonies tried during the study period. For all trials, I observed the
entire jury selection procedure and kept notes on jurors' responses to
questions.
Jury selection in this county used a "sequential method.
' '45
Twelve jurors were called randomly from the venire and seated in the
jury box. The judge introduced the case and typically asked a few
general questions about jurors' names, employment, familiarity with
the case, and whether they knew of any reason they could not be fair
in the case. However, attorneys conducted most of the voir dire
questioning, and the prosecution always commenced. After the
district attorney exercised challenges, those eliminated were replaced,
and the prosecutor asked questions of these replacement jurors. The
defense did not begin questioning until the prosecutor had passed a
panel of twelve. After the defense exercised his or her challenges,
jurors were replaced again, and the process was repeated until both
parties were satisfied with the jurors. Each side was allowed six
peremptory challenges, in addition to one challenge for the alternate.
In trials with multiple defendants, there were six peremptory chal-
lenges available per defendant, per side.
46
The racial profile of jurors selected for trials in this largely bira-
cial county was complex, and has been described in detail elsewhere.
4
44. Of the thirteen cases, there were four cases of homicide (three second-degree murder
and one involuntary manslaughter), one case of felonious assault (which included first-degree
sex offenses), two cases of robbery with a dangerous weapon (one of which was a car-jacking),
two felony drug offenses, two accusations of breaking and entering/possession of stolen goods,
and two cases of obtaining property by false pretenses.
45. Bermant & Shapard, supra note 2.
46. One trial had four defendants, one had three, and the rest had a single defendant.
47. See Rose, supra note 8.
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In brief, there was no overall association between race and being
excused: 41% of African-Americans were excused through the
peremptory compared with 49% of Whites. However, this masked
the adversary nature of excusing African-Americans and Whites. Of
the African-Americans dismissed, 71% were eliminated by the state;
of Whites dismissed, 81% were eliminated by the defense. Gender
showed little association with selection status. Of note, all but one
defendant in these trials were African-American, and only two were
female. The defense exercised 66% of all peremptories.
B. Recruiting People for the Interview
With the permission of the court, a clerk provided me with the
names and addresses of all people who had been questioned, whether
they had been selected for the case or not. Across trials, 345 people
were questioned for potential jury service. Ninety percent of these
people (n = 309) were deemed eligible to participate in the follow-up
survey.48 To recruit for the interview, people with listed telephone
numbers were called directly at their homes. I sent all persons with
unlisted telephone numbers a letter asking if they would be willing to
be contacted.49 For those who did not return the letter, I attempted at
least one "house call" in order to contact the juror personally at the
address listed with the court. An additional seventeen people were
included in the sample through this effort, which was 33% of all
attempts.50  Unlisted persons are underrepresented in the final
sample.5 The total response rate was 67% (range across trials: 39%
48. People were eligible for the follow-up interview if they (a) underwent questioning by at
least one lawyer (and were not simply questioned by the judge) and (b) were part of the initial
pool of jurors called for the trial. The first requirement ensured that I excluded people who
never underwent questioning to determine biases but instead were immediately excused for
obvious conflicts (e.g., being an active duty police officer) or, in some cases, for hardship
circumstances. The second requirement was imposed because, in a few trials, challenges
exhausted the initial group of prospective jurors prior to seating a final panel for the trial;
therefore, the judge summoned a second group of jurors from the jury pool room. As the
second pool of jurors did not have the opportunity to observe the voir dire questioning of those
already seated or excused, they were deemed ineligible for the survey. Thus, only those who
had an opportunity to observe the same jury selection process (prior to being excused, if
applicable), and to receive the same orientation from the trial judge, were included in follow-up.
49. Twenty-two percent responded to the letter and all but two of these people were
successfully contacted and completed the interview.
50. Most people were not home at the time of the visit; only two people refused during in-
person visits.
51. Forty percent of all persons with unlisted telephone numbers were recruited, compared
to 80% of listed persons.
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to 88%).52 All interviews took place within six weeks of the juror's
service to the court. 53
Of the 207 responses, 105 (51%) were from excused jurors, which
includes mostly those dismissed by the peremptory challenge (n = 92),
and a small number dismissed for cause (n = 13). 5 4 Fifty-five percent
of all respondents were women, and 72% were married. The sample
somewhat underrepresents African-Americans, who were 24% of
respondents but 42% of nonresliondents. 5 The sample is well-
educated (54% have a college degree or higher) and middle to upper-
middle income.16 For 54% of participants, the target trial was their
first experience with voir dire.
The interview covered a range of topics, with a special focus on
jurors' views of privacy protection.5 7 In this Paper, I focus on what
excused jurors had to say about why they were dismissed, their
evaluations of that decision, and how these factors relate to other
perceptions of jury selection.
II. PERCEIVED RATIONALES FOR BEING EXCUSED: ACCEPTABLE
JUDGMENTS OR UNWARRANTED STEREOTYPES?
To begin this examination of jurors' reactions to the peremptory
challenge, a basic question concerns jurors' own intuitions about why
52. One exception to this recruitment procedure occurred in a high-profile case, in which
post-verdict press coverage rendered selected jurors highly suspicious about participating in this
study. I therefore sent all selected persons the recruitment letter prior to contacting them by
phone, even if they had a listed phone number. In addition, in another trial, one woman
(excused for cause) became very upset during voir dire after recounting a history of sexual
assault. She was first sent a recruitment letter, in order to respect the possibility that she might
not wish to discuss the particularly sensitive questioning she underwent.
53. All interviews took place over the phone, with the exception of three people who
explicitly requested in-person interviews. In addition, during two of the visits to people with
unlisted numbers, the person requested that that the interview take place immediately. During
phone interviews, responses were typed into a computer database while the person spoke;
during in-person interviews, I took written notes which were later entered into the database.
With both types of recording methods I aimed for verbatim accounts of what the person said,
and I was successful at capturing the vast majority of the answers. See Interviews with Former
Jurors, in a North Carolina County (1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview].
54. Other jurors dismissed through the challenge for cause were ineligible for the survey, as
described earlier. See supra note 48.
55. The race difference in response rates is due in large part to the fact that African-
Americans were more likely to have unlisted phone numbers (51% did, compared to only 24%
of Whites), which made them harder to recruit directly.
56. Sixty-two percent said they had a household income of $45,000 a year or more (in 1997
dollars).
57. For more on this topic, see Rose, supra note 6.
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they had been excused and the extent to which the reason appears to
be an invidious assumption versus a more understandable concern
about how the juror might behave if selected. In this study, I asked
everyone who had been excused to speculate on the reason for their
dismissal. All answers were placed into one of four categories by two
independent coders.
A. Developing Coding Categories and the Meaning of
"Acceptability"
The categories developed for coding were designed to represent
the range of reasons jurors offered to explain their dismissal. 8 In
developing these categories, I made some (testable) assumptions
about which rationales were more likely than others to be acceptable
to the jurors themselves. In doing so, I was aided by considering
some possible extremes of acceptability.
At one extreme, there are people who have strong incentives not
to serve on a given jury due to their life circumstances. For example,
work may be particularly hectic; they may suffer a marked loss in
income by serving, especially if they are self-employed; 9 or they may
have difficulty arranging substitute care for children, sick spouses, or
elders. Frequently these people are unable or unwilling to demon-
strate to the judge that they cannot, per se, be fair and, hence, are not
dismissed through a challenge for cause.60 If the lawyer ultimately
dismisses this person through a peremptory challenge, and if the juror
58. For a categorization and analysis of reasons for peremptory dismissals as offered by
attorneys, see Diamond et al., supra note 8.
59. Jurors in this county were paid twelve dollars per day.
60. For example, at least one judge in this study took the position that he would not dismiss
jurors due to concerns about work because that would put him in the position of having to make
distinctions about which jurors' jobs were more important than others. In any case, most judges
were fairly strict about hardship dismissals and often demanded that jurors demonstrate "actual
bias" to grant a challenge for cause. In other words, jurors had to state that they could not or
would not perform the duties of a juror. Voir dire in these cases might go something like this:
Juror: It's just a very bad time for me at work. I have several very important deadlines
coming up, and although I want to serve, Your Honor, and to do my duty, it's a very,
very bad time.
Judge: Are you saying that, because of these circumstances at work, you are unable to
listen to the evidence, follow my instructions, and render a verdict based on the evi-
dence?
Juror: Well, no, I would certainly try to do my job as a juror....
Judge: So, even given your circumstances at work, you can be fair and impartial?
Juror: Er, yes. I can be fair, but....
Judge: Challenge for cause denied.
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has some indication that the attorney did so because of the hardship,6
then the juror in this situation is quite likely to feel good about the
challenge and about being "helped" by the attorney.62
Contrast this scenario with a juror who believes that she was
dismissed because of some simplistic, group-based stereotype, such as
her race, religion, or other important feature of identity. This person
is likely to view this use of the peremptory as unacceptable, or, at the
very least, to view it as less acceptable than the person who believes
that the lawyer used a peremptory to relieve a hardship circumstance.
Beyond simple self-interest, the two extremes are distinguishable by
the fact that in the hardship case, the person's dismissal stemmed
from what he or she said during voir dire (e.g., "It would be very
difficult for me to serve on this case because of my work situation.");
conversely, in the stereotyping case, the juror is dismissed on the basis
of some personal, often immutable, characteristic that is unrelated to
what he or she said during voir dire.
This distinction-between voir dire-related behaviors (or admis-
sions), on the one hand, and stereotypes on the other-seems simple
enough until one considers the complexity of "stereotypes" and the
extent to which assumptions about people might be more or less well-
founded. This is an issue that raises strong feelings. For instance, in
her original work on voir dire, Babcock suggested that the peremp-
tory "avoids trafficking in the core of the truth in most common
stereotypes. ' 63 In recent years, she referred to this as the "most cited
passage" 64 in that paper. The citations come, in part, because of
resentment over the notion that there is a "core of the truth" when
assumptions are made about people.65 Nevertheless, there is an
61. Although challenges were "peremptory," the public nature of voir dire and this court's
use of the sequential method meant that attorneys could on occasion comment on their
dismissals. So an attorney might ask the juror with a difficult time at work a few questions but
then say, "Your Honor, it sounds like Mrs. Jones' mind is going to be elsewhere during the trial,
so I would thank but excuse her at this time." The connection to the hardship rationale would
not be as evident if attorneys did not choose to make such comments or did not have an
opportunity to do so, as might be the case in a "strike" system in which all challenges are
exercised at the same time by both parties, often by indicating decisions only to the judge.
62. In short, the juror must believe that the attorney was acting out of concern for the
hardship and was not using this as a pretext to dismiss the person for some other, less noble
reason (e.g., race or gender).
63. Babcock, supra note 25, at 553.
64. Babcock, supra note 29, at 1146.
65. Hoffman, supra note 7, at 863 ("We are not fooling anyone, except apparently a few
law professors, by refusing to shine the light of rational inquiry on these insupportable
hunches.").
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emerging consensus among social psychologists that stereotypes can
vary in accuracy, 66 and the pertinent academic inquiry seems to be:
under what circumstances are stereotypes relatively more or less
accurate?
67
With respect to jury selection, the accuracy of stereotypes is
likely to vary in how relevant they seem to the tasks that jurors
undertake-namely, the evaluation of a criminal case. For example,
Melilli analyzed attorneys' allegedly race-neutral explanations offered
for defending Batson challenges.68 The author attempted to separate
group-based stereotypes from individual characteristics or circum-
stances that might be addressed through a challenge for cause. 69 The
result was a range of stereotypes varying in the extent to which there
might be a plausible relationship between the stereotype and the job
of jurors. Along with patently suspect rationales, such as the fact that
a juror was "from Texas," "from New York," or was "the same build
as the opposing party,"70 "stereotypes" also included having been a
crime victim in the past, knowing the location of the crime, or having
a relative who has engaged in criminal activity.71 Although all these
examples are indeed based on assumptions about membership in a
given category, such assumptions clearly differ in how closely related
they are to issues that might arise when evaluating a criminal case. A
defense attorney may be engaging in stereotyping if she assumes that
a rape victim might be a little harder on a defendant than someone
who has never been raped-but this stereotype is not a wholly
unreasonable one.
Likewise, I would expect that relevance to legal matters relates
to how accepting jurors will be of the suspected rationales for their
dismissal. A juror who believes her status as a crime victim contrib-
uted to an attorney's decision to dismiss her is probably more likely to
accept this form of stereotyping than a person who believes she was
dismissed because she is White. Similarly, a juror who believes he
was excused by the prosecutor because he has a sibling who is cur-
rently incarcerated is more likely to understand that decision than the
juror who believes he was dismissed because of his age. Of course
66. STEREOTYPE ACCURACY (Yueh-Ting Lee et al. eds., 1995).
67. Id. at 83.
68. Melilli, supra note 6.
69. Id. at 486.
70. Id. at 498.
71. Id.
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jurors could still be annoyed if they feel their past victimizations or
family situation disqualified them from a jury.72 But the empirical
question is: what assumptions are more or less likely to make a juror
accepting of an attorney's decision to exclude that juror. Jurors who
believe that they were categorized on the basis of an experience or
association that gives them unique knowledge of the legal system (or
even of the case itself) seem distinguishable from jurors who believe
they were stereotyped on the basis of other characteristics. My
categorization of suspected rationales therefore separated people who
believed they were excused on the basis of their legally relevant
experiences from those who believed they were excused on the basis
of some personal characteristic. Although it is a rough distinction, if
one is asking about acceptability, then it is expected to be a distinc-
tion with a difference. 3
Two coders74 placed all responses into one the following four
categories:
(1) Behavior in Court. People were placed into this category if
they said they were dismissed because of concerns about time con-
flicts due to work or childcare. In addition, this category also cap-
tures people who cited other types of behavior during voir dire that
might have given a lawyer pause. Jurors in this sample gave reasons
72. As one juror in this study commented: "Your family isn't going to be on the jury, you
are.... If it's my [criminal] record [that leads to my being excused], OK, but [a family member]
could die in the gas chamber, and it's not you." Interview, supra note 53, No. 905. This
quotation and the issue of stereotyping with respect to privacy protection is discussed in Rose,
supra note 6, at 15.
73. Neil Vidmar's article in this symposium provides additional data on a specific type of
"legal experiences." Neil Vidmar, When All of Us Are Victims: Juror Prejudice and "Terrorist"
Trials, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1143 (2003). He considers instances in which crimes (terrorist
attacks) affect so wide a swath of the public that it is difficult to find anyone who has not had a
"legal experience." Id.
74. Although the categorizations are broad, having two coders allowed me to determine
how reliable the coding is-that is, how likely it is that a different set of raters would come to
the same conclusions. This was especially important given that the coding would be used in
subsequent analyses. The present categorization proved highly reliable as measured by a kappa
coefficient in which fractions closer to 1.0 suggest better reliability. See, e.g., Jacob Cohen,
Weighted Kappa: Nominal Scale Agreement with Provision for Scaled Disagreement or Partial
Credit, 70 PSYCHOL. BULL. 213 (1968). Reliability in this study was affected by the fact that a
small subset of jurors in this sample gave more than one reason for their dismissal and coders
were allowed to double-code in these instances; one of the coders, however, was more diligent
than the other in this regard. If we were to count all the double-codes as agreements (i.e., the
two coders agreed on at least one of the codes), the kappa statistic is .84 (weighted value = .86),
indicating excellent reliability. Even counting all the instances of double-coding as disagree-
ments, reliability is still high, .72 (weighted value = .74). All disagreements between coders
were solved through discussion and consensus about which code best described each person's
response.
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such as, "I was hesitant about whether I could be fair," or, "I think I
was being kind of flip in my responses." To be coded into this cate-
gory, the jurors had to make a specific reference to a statement or
behavior that was part of voir dire. If they just said, "I'm smarter
than they wanted," that would be coded into "Personal Characteris-
tics."
(2) Legal Experiences. Excused jurors were placed into this cate-
gory if they had unique legal or case knowledge, indicated by citing
any of the following as reasons for their having been excused: (i)
having been a victim of a crime, (ii) knowing a victim of a crime, (iii)
having been charged with a crime, (iv) knowing someone who has
been charged with a crime, (v) having familiarity with the case or
knowing one of the parties or witnesses in the case, or (vi) having
served on a jury before. If legal knowledge stemmed from the juror's
occupation (e.g., being an attorney), it was considered a personal
characteristic.
75
(3) Personal Characteristics. This refers to reasons for dismissal
based on features that make up a person's identity. Personal charac-
teristics tend to be immutable (e.g., race, gender, being a grand-
mother), although occupation, associations in voluntary
organizations, or even the characteristics of one's spouse are included
here though people can, in theory, change these facts about them-
selves.
(4) Cannot Say. A small subset of jurors had no idea why they
were excused and would not even speculate.
B. Results: Distribution Across Categories
Table 1 reports the distribution of reasons cited by jurors to ex-
plain why they had been excused through a peremptory challenge.
Only six people fell into the Cannot Say category; 76 the remaining
75. The decision to place attorneys into the Personal Characteristics category despite their
legal knowledge stemmed from a desire to isolate people who had had salient or unique
experiences with the legal system in the past. For practicing attorneys, their legal experiences
are of a more routine nature and therefore seemed distinguishable from the legal experiences
captured in this category.
76. The high number of people offering a guess as to why they were excused may stem
from the court's use of a sequential selection method. In this system, one side exercises
challenges at the end of a round of questioning, which means that jurors know whether the state
or the defense excused them. In addition, sometimes inquiries are tailored to one juror's unique
circumstances. If jurors are excused shortly after they have been extensively questioned by one
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eighty-six people dismissed through the peremptory felt they knew
the reason or were willing to speculate.
77
Before discussing the results further, it is important to empha-
size, once again, that these are the reasons the jurors cite for their
dismissal, rather than the actual reason (which no one but the attor-
ney knows). On the one hand, some, jurors may be minimizing or
softening discrimination. For example, one elderly African-American
woman said she thought the fact that she has "sons and grandsons"
made the district attorney worry that she might be sympathetic to the
defendant. It is equally plausible that she was dismissed because she
was the same race as the defendant. 78 On the other hand, some jurors
may be minimizing the effect of past experiences. One woman said
that she was dismissed because she is a member of an "advocacy
group," and she was therefore coded into the Personal Characteristics
category. This advocacy group, however, was Parents of Murdered
Children and the woman was sitting for a homicide case. She claimed
both during voir dire and during my interview that her experience
with her son's death would not affect her ability to be fair and impar-
tial in the present case. 79 In short, the coding was done on the basis of
the reasons the jurors reported. 80
party, the attorney's reasoning about the juror is somewhat more obvious than it might be in a
strike system.
77. Some people clearly indicated that they were just guessing. I do not attempt to analyze
these people separately because (1) there were very few of them; and (2) what they guessed to
be the reason seems as or more important than the mere fact of having to guess.
78. Either way, this person was coded into the Personal Characteristics category, but one
can also imagine a situation where a crime victim guesses his past experience to be the reason
when the attorney was actually paying attention to race-a situation which, if known, would
change the juror's categorization.
79. She told me that her son was the victim of an accidental shooting, whereas the victim in
the present case had been beaten to death, which she regarded as completely different
circumstances.
80. Although jurors could have cited more than one reason, only eight people did so, and
these were identified by at least one of the coders. See supra note 74. Given double-codes, I
had to determine which category to place the person into for analysis purposes and drew, in
part, upon my notes of their voir dires and which issue seemed to be discussed most often. This
is the only way in which my notes or recollection of jury selection explicitly determined
categorization.
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Table 1:
Reasons Jurors Cited for Being Dismissed Through the Peremptory
(N = 92)
Category N Examples
Behavior in 16 Conflicts with work, care-giving, or juror
Court takes medication (8)
Hesitated/uncertain on questions, looked
nervous, or was flip (5)
Reluctant to send someone to jail (1)
Communicated strong views regarding
O.J. Simpson case (1)
Watched defendant intently (1)
Legal Experi- 27 Knew party, witness, attorney, or victim's
ences family member(8)
Crime victim in family (6)
Crime victim them self (4)
Read about or had other knowledge of
case (4)
Been a juror or grand juror (3)
Been a witness in court before (2)
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Table 1 continued:
Category N Examples
Personal 43 Occupation (12)
Characteristics Relatives/friends are attorneys or juror
knew associates of the
attorneys in case (9)
Race/gender/age (9)
Voluntary associations or religion (6)
Relatives/friends in law enforcement
(4)
Conservative views (1)
Never been in trouble before (1)
Has sons and grandsons (1)
Cannot Say 6
why
Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of people giving that
reason within each category.
(1) Behavior in Court. Sixteen people made reference to their
behavior in court as the reason for having been excused; half of this
group mentioned their hardship circumstance. This hardship group
includes those who had conflicts with employment and those who
provided care-giving for sick relatives, as well as one juror who said
the effects of medication and her medical needs might interfere with
her ability to serve.81 The remaining people in this category all
referred to comments they had made or behaviors they had engaged
in during voir dire, such as expressing hesitation about an issue (e.g.,
being fair to the police) or looking nervous. For instance, despite a
fairly long soliloquy from the district attorney that jurors do not
sentence, one person reported reluctance to send someone to jail
81. This person had recently been to a doctor for pain in her lower leg. She was beginning
to take pain medication, until a diagnosis was definitive. The juror could not say with any
certainty whether the drugs would have problematic side effects or whether she might be
summoned back to the doctor if the problem was identified or needed further attention.
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(although he promised to try to overcome this); during the follow-up
interview, this person said that this reluctance probably contributed
to his dismissal. Another juror in a different case spent a few mo-
ments of voir dire expressing his outrage over the O.J. Simpson
verdict and how it made him question the justice system (again
promising to set aside this view); he thought the defense attorney
factored this into his decision. Finally, another speculated that he was
dismissed because he was being very "attentive" during voir dire, in
particular, that he watched the defendant quite carefully.
(2) Legal Experiences. Twenty-seven people were coded as hav-
ing had some personal experience that related to the case or revealed
involvement in the legal system. The largest group of people (n = 8)
knew a witness, one of the attorneys 2 or a relative of the victim.
None claimed that these associations would affect their abilities to be
fair, although a couple of these cases presented great challenges in
this regard. One juror knew the deceased victim's wife and invested
money for her as part of the juror's job at a bank. The victim's wife
was, in fact, engaged in a civil suit regarding the same circumstances
that were being tried as a criminal matter. During my interview with
the juror, she expressed great relief over having been dismissed
because maintaining impartiality-though theoretically achievable-
would have been very difficult, and the juror felt that the case might
have implications for the business relationship. For example, she said
that it might have been awkward to interact with her client after the
trial.81 Another knew the defendant through the juror's work in a
county prison; that is, she knew the defendant as a former inmate.
She, too, was glad that she was dismissed, although did not say during
voir dire that she lacked impartiality.
82. The people who reported that they knew the attorney had to have knowledge of one of
the attorneys trying the case. If they merely knew a friend of the attorney or the attorney's
colleague (e.g., they knew the elected district attorney but not the prosecuting attorney), they
were coded into the Personal Characteristics category because this was considered less of a
direct connection to the case. One person was placed in the Legal Experiences category even
though he knew not the ADA but the ADA's wife; this person, however, had been to the
prosecutor's house and was in a book group with the ADA's wife, which was considered more
than a remote connection to the attorney.
83. The attorney in this case did not attempt to challenge this juror for cause because, even
after several questions, the juror would never say that the situation threatened her impartiality.
Indeed, at one point, the juror agreed that the situation-especially the fact that a guilty verdict
might help the wife's civil suit-posed a conflict of interest: "I do think it's a conflict of interest.
But if you are asking, 'Can I be fair?' I think I can." Interview, supra note 53, No. 901.
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Six jurors suggested that their having had a family member who
was a victim of a crime determined their dismissal; another four
suggested it was their own experience with crime. The crimes at issue
were sometimes fairly commonplace, as with one juror who said that
his grown child's house had been burglarized. Still others reported
crimes that were stark and sometimes closely related to the case. For
instance, two jurors in separate cases, each involving armed robberies,
had themselves been robbed at gunpoint. One woman had been
raped as a child and was sitting for service on a case involving a sexual
assault. In one case involving questions of spousal abuse and homi-
cide, a prospective juror admitted that his brother had murdered his
own wife and then turned the gun on himself. All these jurors
maintained during voir dire that these experiences would not affect
their abilities to be fair to the state or to the defendant.
Four of the remaining jurors in the Legal Experiences category
had knowledge of the case either by having read about it or through
other experiences (e.g., by living near the crime scene or having
handled the deceased's medical records as part of the juror's job).
Three jurors speculated that their service on juries in the past (includ-
ing two of whom had been grand jurors) affected the attorneys'
decisions; another two suggested the reason they had been excused
was that they had been witnesses in court before (one as an expert
witness and one as a witness for the state in a homicide case).
(3) Personal Characteristics. Nearly half of those excused (47%)
cited personal characteristics as the basis for their dismissal. These
personal characteristics involved a range of issues about which the
jurors suspected stereotypes as the basis. Twelve people mentioned
their current or former occupations as the basis for the decision.
These occupations involved prior military service or law enforcement,
being a pharmacist, 84 teacher, attorney, "managerial type," or other
occupations that might raise issues similar to those involved in the
case, for example, one case involved theft from a store and the juror
had previously been a store manager. Nine jurors suspected that their
associations with attorneys-either as spouses or friends, or because
they have mutual acquaintances with the attorneys trying the case-
might have explained their dismissal; another four thought their
associations with people in law enforcement might be the basis for
their dismissal.
84. This juror was sitting for a drug case.
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Although any stereotyping raises troubling questions about
overgeneralizations and inaccurate inferences, the remaining personal
characteristics seem paradigmatic of what most concerns people
about the peremptory challenge. Nine people cited their race, age, or
gender as the reason for their dismissal, although they usually men-
tioned these characteristics in combination or with other profiles
(e.g., "probably because I was a young white male who possessed a
firearm";85 "I was a senior citizen, white, and had a policeman for a
father"86). All of the people remarking on race specifically (n = 7)
were White, and all were dismissed by the defense. In addition to
these demographics, a few jurors reported being profiled on the basis
of holding conservative views (dismissed by the defense), being a
mother and grandmother, or having not "been in trouble" before.
The person voicing this last explanation elaborated:
Juror: [Hiere's a lady that's lived in [this city] all her life, worked,
raised three children-all went to school-and she's never given
anyone no trouble. And sometimes they think that if she's not
been in trouble, she won't think anyone else should. But it ain't
like that.
Interviewer: How do you feel if that's the reason?
Juror: It's all right if they feel like that. I am proud of myself.
87
Another six people cited88 their voluntary associations, including
their religions, as personal characteristics that explain why they were
dismissed.89 The voluntary associations cited were the Parents of
Murdered Children group, the Junior League, and a remote connec-
tion to the Ronald McDonald House (in a case involving a McDon-
ald's restaurant).
85. Interview, supra note 53, No. 1029.
86. Id. No. 1403.
87. Id. No. 1406.
88. Half of the six people who mentioned voluntary associations mentioned religion. Two
indicated it was because they were Christian, and another said it was because he was a minister.
Although one could say that for the minister, his occupation was the characteristic upon which
the attorneys focused, it seems clear that it is his occupation as a religious person that is the
issue.
89. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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C. Ambivalent Jurors as Collaborators in Stereotyping: Some
Examples
The last two cases regarding assumptions about voluntary or-
ganizations merit further explanation because they both demonstrate
the ambivalence some jurors may have about the use of stereotypes
during jury selection. Both explanations come from the same trial,
which was expected to last about two weeks, rendering most people
reluctant to serve. During voir dire, the woman who cited the Junior
League as the reason for her dismissal discussed her lack of childcare
during the trial but was not excused for cause, and the state's attorney
also did not dismiss her after his questioning. When I asked this juror
during the interview why she had been excused, she responded as
follows:
Juror: Because I told him [the defense attorney] I belonged to the
Junior League. I think people have this misconception. I think
they think it's a group of women-as they say, "pearls and white
gloves" -who are opinionated. There may be women like that, but
I don't think I am or that the people here [in this county] are.
Interviewer: How do you feel if that is the reason?
Juror: I guess I was glad that it got me off the jury at a time I
needed to get off. They weren't respecting the fact of child care. I
guess I can't prove them-I don't have the opportunity to defend
or explain myself, so I'll have to leave it at that 0
The second woman said she was excused because her church had
given money to the Ronald McDonald House. She admitted during
the interview that she looked for ways to be dismissed:
Juror: The questioning at the beginning was thorough, but by the
time I got to the jury box they only broadly covered the questions;
there was not as much in-depth. I said [to myself], "If they ask me
that, I'll answer it this way." But I didn't get to answer because
they didn't ask me that question.... I'll say why I was excused. I'd
gone through what I could think of for valid reasons [to be off the
jury]. When the lawyer was asking questions about your church
and whether you belong to any organizations, I told him I belonged
to a church, and he asked which one. I gave him more information
than he asked for about what organizations in the community my
church supports. I listed the organizations, including Ronald
McDonald House. And then he asked if it would be difficult to be
fair and impartial considering this case involved a McDonald's. I
said, "I don't think so." And he said he hadn't thought about until
90. Interview, supra note 53, No. 1010.
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just then, and I said I hadn't either. Then after talking with his cli-
ent, they dismissed me. The two had not-I had not-thought
about it prior.
Interviewer: How do you feel if that's the reason?
Juror: That was like saying that because of this, you can't be fair
and impartial, but they didn't know that. I could have been.91
These examples are remarkable in several respects. First, both
jurors suggest a collaborative effort with the attorneys to have
themselves removed. When asked why she was dismissed, the Junior
League member did not simply cite her association with the group but
instead said, "Because I told him I belonged to the Junior League,
92
hinting that she knew the disclosure would leave a certain impression.
The other woman more explicitly admitted to planning answers ahead
of time and to "giving more information than he asked for '93 when
discussing her church's donations. Quite clearly both women did not
want to sit on this jury. On the other hand, both sounded ultimately
disappointed that the lawyer, in essence, "took the bait" and dis-
missed them when the jurors felt these factors had nothing whatso-
ever to do with their abilities to be impartial. Complicating the entire
matter is the fact that these examples come from a case that involved
multiple defense attorneys (for multiple young African-American
male defendants), each of whom worked to fashion a highly unrepre-
sentative final panel.94 In the end, it is possible these women-who
were both White and upper middle-class-were complicit in helping
the attorneys make use of a stereotype, just not the ones the women
had in mind. They may have simply given the attorney a useful
pretext for a race-based peremptory. 95
D. Results: Acceptability
I have suggested that the reasons jurors cite for why they have
been dismissed probably differ in acceptability, but thus far I have
shown only that the reasons proffered did span the range of catego-
ries (from Behavior in Court to Legal Experiences to Personal
91. Id. No. 1021.
92. Id. No. 1010, No. 1021.
93. Id. No. 1021, No. 1010.
94. African-Americans constituted 71% of the final panel which is more than twice their
prevalence in the county.




Characteristics). I have also offered some instances in which jurors
reported finding the use of personal characteristics to be unwar-
ranted-even if they appreciated getting out of jury duty. The
remaining question is whether the categories do, in fact, reflect
differences in how acceptable the decision seems to the juror.
This study offered two ways of assessing this question, both of
which involved two different items. During the interview, all jurors
assessed their abilities as jurors by rating the extent to which they
thought they could have been fair and impartial jurors and their
confidence in their abilities to be fair and impartial.96 In addition,
jurors indicated their support for the decision by rating their satisfac-
tion with the decision to excuse them along with the fairness of that
decision.9 7 Those who view the rationale for their dismissal as more
acceptable should likewise express greater doubts about their abilities
to have been fair and to express more support for the decision to
dismiss them (in terms of satisfaction and fairness).
Table 2 presents these ratings across the categories of reasons for
dismissal. Those dismissed through the challenge for cause are also
included for comparison because they were dismissed for actual bias,
and therefore are expected to view that decision as the most accept-
able. In addition, due to the small size of the Cannot Say category, I
96. These items were: (1) "Thinking back to how you felt during the jury selection process,
did you personally believe you could be a fair and impartial juror in this case? Would you say,
'Yes,' 'No,' or you are 'Not sure?"' Answers were then coded 1 = yes, 2 = not sure, and 3 = no;
thus lower numbers indicate a greater belief in one's own fairness; and (2) "How confident
would you say you felt that you could be fair and impartial? On a scale from 1 to 7 where '1' is
'not at all confident' and '7' is 'very confident,' how would you rate yourself?." These two items
are strongly related to one another, r = -.54 (p < .0001).
97. The two items indicating support for the outcome were: (1) "On a scale from 1 to 7,
how satisfied were you with the decision to have been excused from this particular jury?
Suppose '1' is 'very unsatisfied' and '7' is 'completely satisfied?"' and (2) "On a scale from 1 to
7, how fair was the decision to excuse you from this particular jury? Suppose '1' is 'very unfair'
and '7' is 'very fair?"'
These two items are strongly related to one another (r = .55, p < .0001). These two items
were modestly related to the two items measuring agreement with the decision. Decision
satisfaction correlated with belief in one's own fairness (r = -.23, p < .05) and confidence in one's
own fairness (r = .24, p < .05). Decision fairness was less highly related to the other two (r = -
.15, p < .22 and r = .21, p < .07, respectively). As will be discussed below, see infra note 100,
decision fairness proved to be a difficult item for people to assess. I opted not to combine items
into aggregate measures. In the case of abilities to be fair, the two items were measured on
different scales; in the case of support for outcome, I wanted to distinguish satisfaction from
fairness, especially given the complexities associated with decision fairness.
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combined these responses with those of the Personal Characteristics
group.98
Consistent with expectations, jurors in the Personal Characteris-
tics category expressed the least support for the decision to excuse
them. Compared to the other categories of excused jurors, this group
was significantly"9 more likely to believe they could have been fair
jurors and to be confident in their abilities to be fair. By significant
margins, this group was the least satisfied with the decision to be
excused and regarded this decision as the least fair. 100
98. Placing the Cannot Say group into the Personal Characteristics category-as opposed
to the other two groups-was done for multiple reasons. First, there is an a priori concern that
this group, like the Personal Characteristics group, will be especially troubled by the peremptory
challenge decision because these respondents are essentially bewildered as to why they were
dismissed. Second, empirical analysis showed that the ratings of the Cannot Say group most
resembled those of the Personal Characteristics category.
99. "Significantly" in this sense refers to a significant statistical difference between the
groups. A statistical difference allows one to determine whether the mean ratings from
different groups, which appear to be different from one another, actually are. For example, the
Legal Experiences category may have a mean of 6.22 on decisions satisfaction, whereas the
personal characteristics group has a mean of 5.10. One certainly seems larger than the other,
but an actual difference depends upon how much variability there was among jurors' ratings
within those categories. Further, there is a chance that differences in results could have been a
fluke, and that if the same study were done many times the difference would not appear. By use
of a hypothetical, statistical significance assigns a probability value to the following: "How likely
is it that I would observe a difference between two groups that is this large or larger, if I were to
assume that, in reality, the two groups did not differ at all?" If the probability is high, one
assumes that the groups do not differ from one another, even if they appear to have "different"
mean ratings. If the probability is low-typically defined as 1 in 20 or less (p < .05)-then the
difference between the groups can be treated as "real" -although one always seeks other
evidence, such as replication of the result, in order to actually regard it as a true difference.
The probability values for the ratings in Table 2 were derived from an overall test (called
an ANOVA) of whether there were any differences across the groups, and then specific
comparisons of differences between any two groups (called t-tests). I conducted these tests after
examining whether models should be adjusted for any jury-level effects, meaning that perhaps
some of the variation in ratings is due to differences across the trials and not just across jurors.
All tests indicated that adjustments for trial-level effects were unnecessary.
100. Decision fairness did not involve the same pattern of significant differences. On this
variable, the Personal Characteristics ratings did not differ significantly from the Behavior in
Court group. It should be noted that the decision fairness item proved difficult for people to
assess, best indicated by the large number of missing cases (n = 19). Missing values were present
for twelve people in the Personal Characteristics category, five in Legal Experiences category,
and two in the Behavior in Court category. The item may have been challenging because the
true reason for their dismissal was unavailable (e.g., a juror might say, "If the decision is based
on racial discrimination, then it is unfair; if it is because I made the attorney nervous because I
don't like attorneys, then it was fair."). In addition, some jurors would ask me, "Well, fair to
whom?," suggesting they might make distinctions between their interests and those of the
attorneys. In future work, I would like to ask the question in multiple ways; for the present,
however, the decision fairness item should be treated with some conservatism because other
jurors may have had difficulty rating the item but were less inclined to refuse to do so outright.
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Table 2:
Excused Jurors' Views of Their Abilities To Be Fair in Target Trial,
Decision Satisfaction, and Decision Fairness, By Category of Sus-
pected Reasons for Dismissal.
Behavior Legal Personal Cause-
in Court Experiences Characteristics challenged
(n = 16) (n = 27) (n = 49) (n = 13)
Believe 1.69a 1.44a (0.80) 1.22
b (0.44) 1.85a
could be (0.87) (0.55)
fair*
Confident 5.50a 5.67'(1.84) 6.53h-(1.00) 3.62c
could be (1.46) (2.10)
fair
Decision 6.13a 6.22a (1.34) 5.10b(2.05) 6.92'
satisfac- (1.54) (0.28)
tion
Decision 5.71ab 6.14 (1.32) 5.08b (1.07) 6.92a
fairness (1.94) 1 1 (0.28)
Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
Within a row, means that have no superscripts in common differ
significantly (p < .05) from one another.
*Lower values on this item means a stronger belief in one's ability
to be fair; for all other items, higher scores reflect more confidence,
satisfaction, and fairness.
The other two categories (Behavior in Court and Legal Experi-
ences) did not differ significantly from one another on any of the
items. In fact, members of both groups seemed particularly suppor-
tive of the decision to excuse them: on decision satisfaction and
decision fairness, their ratings were comparable to those dismissed
through the challenge for cause.
E. Summary
This study is the first to ask jurors for their assessments of why
they had been eliminated from a jury panel. Critics of the peremp-
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tory challenge sometimes claim that those dismissed in this manner
are "perfectly acceptable, perfectly fair, and perfectly impartial"'' 1
and must feel betrayed and disillusioned by the decision. Although
not conclusively demonstrating the appropriateness of these dismiss-
als, jurors' reports about their jury selection experiences revealed
several notable results.
First, jurors frequently suspect that attorneys made use of
"stereotypes" and assumptions about jurors when deciding whom to
dismiss. However, beliefs about the these supposed stereotypes vary
in acceptability. Over half the people excused either had no idea why
they had been deemed incapable or cited group-based stereotypes
that often had tenuous connections to the case before them. On
average, this group was more confident in their abilities to keep an
open mind, and had the lowest decision fairness and decision satisfac-
tion ratings. Although the results are based on a small number of
self-rated assessments, they are consistent with the concern that the
peremptory challenge can sometimes "waste" people who may well
have been up to the job.102 However, nearly half the sample showed
support for the attorneys' decisions. Those who linked likely ration-
ales to their own words or behavior during voir dire, as well as those
who cited their unique legal knowledge and experience, tended to
express more doubts about their abilities to be fair and to rate the
decision to excuse them more favorably. This in no way proves that
these jurors could not have been fair and impartial had they been
seated, but it does suggest that a substantial number of jurors seem
neither confused nor offended by why they were dismissed. 10 3
Second, these interviews documented jurors' frequent reluctance
or unwillingness to admit even a little partiality. For example,
according to jurors, lawyers sometimes used peremptories to elimi-
nate people who reported work or child-care conflicts. These people
101. Hoffman, supra note 7, at 858.
102. See supra note 19.
103. It could be argued that the differences among the groups on perceptions of their own
fairness and view of the decision simply reflects different levels of desire to be on the jury. That
is, perhaps those who cited their behavior in court or their legal experiences had less interest in
serving than those who cited personal characteristics as the reason for their dismissal and then
made their decision ratings accordingly. All jurors in this study rated how much they wanted to
be on the particular jury for which they had been questioned. There were no significant
differences on this item across the categories of people dismissed through the peremptory,
suggesting that interest in serving did not account for differences across groups on the outcome
measures.
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were not dismissed through the challenge for cause largely because
even this group-though highly motivated to get out of jury duty-
would not say that they were unable to be fair and impartial. Cer-
tainly this could reflect the powerful sense of duty that is emphasized
during voir dire, as jurors are keenly aware that if they are not
chosen, others present will have to take their place. But it may also
speak to the difficulty of cogently evaluating the most basic question
posed during voir dire: "Can you set aside these issues and be fair and
impartial?"
Finally, further evidence of the difficulty of assessing one's own
bias came from those who had harrowing past experiences with crime
or who had tangled relationships with parties in the case. Many of
these people maintained during voir dire that they could keep an
open mind. However, in several cases, their tone was different by the
time of the interview. Perhaps because the attorneys had already
rendered a decision about them, or perhaps because of the more
relaxed atmosphere of a telephone conversation, many of these
people confessed that the service would have been hard for them and
that the outcome was probably for the best. Although social science
has already demonstrated that people are not particularly good at
either identifying their biases or gauging their influences, 1°4 the
current study is a reminder of the strong forces acting on jurors
during voir dire and that according to jurors' own assessments, the
peremptory seems to eliminate a set of people who are probably best
able to serve elsewhere.
III. RATINGS OF THE JURY SELECTION EXPERIENCE AND
DEFINITIONS OF FAIR TREATMENT
The previous section shows that variations in the perceived ac-
ceptability of a decision to excuse a juror were associated with
support for that decision. Of course, viewing a decision as unaccept-
able is not the same thing as having a negative opinion of jury selec-
tion in its entirety. The literature on procedural justice suggests that,
in some circumstances, people can disagree with or dislike an out-
come but nevertheless make an independent, positive assessment of
104. Richard E. Nisbett, & Timothy D. Wilson, Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal
Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231 (1977).
[Vol 78:1061
A VOIR DIRE OF VOIR DIRE
the procedures used to arrive at a decision. 105 A crucial question
remains as to whether this is true of jury selection or whether, as
critics fear, the experience of being both stereotyped and eliminated
from a jury harms jurors' perceptions of the court.
Several questions from this study address impressions of jury se-
lection. During the interview, former jurors were asked, "Overall,
how satisfied were you with the jury selection experience?" In
addition, they assessed how willing they would be to serve on a jury in
the future. I also asked all respondents to rate the following items,
"How fairly were you treated during jury selection?"' 1 and "How
fairly were other people treated during jury selection?" 10 7  Fair
treatment is a particularly important issue. If jurors dismissed from
service report being treated in an unfair or shabby manner, this would
be a severe indictment of the entire voir dire process, including the
peremptory challenge.
A. Results: Quantitative Ratings
Table 3 presents the results of these items across the categories
described in the previous section. Except for a small difference
between the Personal Characteristics group and those excused
through the challenge for cause on the willingness variable,los this
table requires no other notations to mark significant differences
because, quite simply, there is little variation in any of these ratings
105. LIND & TYLER, supra note 42, at 112 ("The elation or disappointment prompted by the
verdict would not erase the effects of such factors as opportunity for expression of your side of
the case.").
106. All ratings were made on a 1 to 7 scale in which higher values correspond to higher
satisfaction with jury selection, more willingness to return in the future, and more fair treatment.
107. Initially, I had wanted to be able to distinguish between how people perceived their
own treatment from how they viewed the treatment of others because the two need not be
identical. This distinction proved unnecessary, as the ratings of the two items were highly
correlated (r =.76), meaning that if one was high, so was the other.
108. The fact that those excused through the challenge for cause had somewhat lower
ratings of their willingness to serve again is intriguing, especially given the fact that, unlike the
peremptory challenge, commentators are not typically concerned about how the challenge for
cause affects jurors' views of the court. However, it is possible that these jurors suspect that
they are unlikely to be selected for any trial, and in that sense, returning to the court in the
future seems to be a waste of time. Beliefs about one's abilities to be a good juror have been
linked to lack of response to jury summonses. See, e.g., Robert G. Boatright, Why Citizens
Don't Respond to Jury Summonses and What Courts Can Do About It, 82 JUDICATURE 156,
159 (1999). Nonetheless, it should be noted that while there is high variability (high standard
deviations) for the willingness variable, the effect observed here is small, and the Cause-
challenged group is significantly different only from the Personal Characteristics group (who
had the highest rating of willingness to return).
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associated with the coding categories. Regardless of whether jurors
believed they had been dismissed because of their behavior in court,
their legal experiences, their personal characteristics, or some other
reason, overall satisfaction with jury selection, willingness to return in




Excused Jurors' Ratings of Overall Satisfaction with Jury Selection,
Willingness to Serve in the Future, and Fair Treatment, By Category
of Suspected Reasons for Dismissal.
Behavior Legal Personal Cause-
in Court Experiences Characteristic challenged
(n = 16) (n = 27) (n = 49)(n=13)
Overall 4.88 4.81 (1.92) 4.79 (1.76) 4.38
satisfaction (1.54) (1.26)
Willingness 5.19 5.07 5.57 (1.90)' 4.23
to serve in (2.22)ab (2.11)ab (2.20)b
the future
Fair 6.28 6.17 (1.11) 6.28 (1.22) 6.42
treatment (1.26) (1.22)
All ratings made on a 1 to 7 scale, with higher values corresponding
to more satisfaction, willingness, and sense of fair treatment. Stan-
dard deviations appear in parentheses.
Within a row, means that have no superscripts in common differ
significantly (p <.05) from one another.
The numerical value of the means in Table 3 is also informative.
Jurors' overall satisfaction with jury selection was modest (just above
the midpoint of a 7-point scale), and willingness to return in the
future was only somewhat higher. Ratings of fair treatment, however,
were quite high-consistently above a 6. Quite clearly, though they
109. In other work, I consider which factors predict overall satisfaction with jury selection
and willingness to return in the future. Results suggest privacy protection plays a role in overall
satisfaction, especially among those excused; individual desire to serve on a jury and race were
correlated with willingness to return to serve in the future. See Mary R. Rose, Compelling
Disclosures: Jury Selection and the Distribution of a Duty (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
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had been dismissed from a jury, the group of jurors interviewed for
this study felt that they had been treated fairly.
What accounts for these high marks? A partial explanation may
lie in how jurors describe the meaning of fair treatment in this setting.
This is a useful question to ask not only as a way to understand the
quantitative ratings of fair treatment, but also to gain a better under-
standing of the dimensions of fairness underlying jury selection.
After all, although this court received high ratings, perhaps other
courts may not perform so admirably, and this study presents an
opportunity to understand on what bases jurors assess fair treatment.
Immediately after they made their fair treatment ratings, I asked
all jurors: "What specifically made you feel that potential jurors were
treated either fairly or unfairly?" I looked for clusters of responses
and considered in particular how often jurors made reference to
decisions made about whom to excuse-either positively or nega-
tively-in defining fair or unfair treatment. Because I asked about
the treatment of all potential jurors, the inquiry here is not limited to
the perceptions of those excused. The particulars of fair treatment as
seen by those selected is included in order to gain the most compre-
hensive view of fair treatment. 110
B. Results: Qualitative Descriptions of Fair Treatment
An issue that is clearly important to jurors is the observation that
authorities are even-handed with people: eighty-one people made
reference to the extent to which the court treated everyone the same
either in the types of questions asked or how people were treated
more generally."' For instance, one juror describes being impressed
during the voir dire of a well-known local news anchor:
They questioned him for a long time, and they were going to keep
him until he said he may have read some things through his work
that wouldn't go into evidence. I thought it was interesting that
they were seriously considering this guy even though he has this
110. Selected jurors had slightly higher ratings, on average, than those excused. The
selected group's rating was 6.62 (SD = 0.68), the excused group's was 6.27 (SD = 1.19).
Although small, this difference is statistically significant: t = 2.58, p < .05.
111. A decision maker's neutrality has been identified as a key component of procedural
justice. See, Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive: Antecedents of
Distributive and Procedural Justice, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 850 (1994).
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prominent job in town. I thought, "He's being treated just like the
rest of us." '112
As the quantitative ratings of fair treatment suggested, comments
about even-handedness were overwhelmingly positive. Only 12% of
people discussed consistency of treatment in a negative light. Two
people thought questioning had not been consistent across people;
four people thought they observed differentiations in treatment on
the basis of race; four people thought that upper-class or better-
educated people were favored; and one person questioned whether
summoning to the box for questioning was truly done on a random
basis (although this person did not suggest what alternative system
might have been used).
As critics of the peremptory suspect, how selection decisions are
made does emerge as an issue of fair treatment. Sixty-two people
(about 30% of the sample) defined fair treatment in terms of deci-
sions about whom to excuse, and 44% of these people held a negative
view of how these decisions were made or carried out. As it turns
out, however, the bulk of negative responses were not directed at the
attorneys' decisions, but rather at those of the judge. When asked
what constituted fair treatment, thirty-one people mentioned the
handling of hardship cases, fully half (n = 16) viewing these in a
negative light. Further, in these negative comments the judge was
criticized for being overly harsh or unsympathetic when people gave
what these jurors saw as legitimate reasons for being unable to serve.
In other words, decision making as an issue of fair treatment
concerned not whether some people were dismissed when they should
not have been, but rather whether people were inappropriately
required to serve. When service presented a difficult conflict for
people in terms of lost wages or care-giving responsibilities, jurors
expected the court to make allowances. For example, the judge in
one case refused a for cause challenge for a woman who was a single
mother, who cleaned homes for a living, and who would go without
money for the length of the trial. A juror disapproved, saying, "I
don't think that was fair. They should have let her off. She's not
living on the welfare system.""' 3 Likewise, those complimenting the
112. Interview, supra note 53, No. 912. The respondent's assessment of why the news
anchor was excused (by the defense) may be correct, but I would note that the juror also stated
initially that he expected a defendant to testify in his own defense. After some follow-up
questioning he maintained that he preferred the defendant to do so but did not require it.
113. Id. No. 601.
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court on this dimension consistently did so by noting that people were
not "forced" to serve when it would be difficult for them. Only two
people felt that hardship excuses were too easy to obtain, suggesting
the court accepted the "lamest excuses"1 4 in letting people off.
The other thirty-one people who discussed decision making as an
issue of fair treatment mentioned whether it seemed like the people
selected or excused could have "done the job."1 5 Of these people,
nearly two-thirds reported that decisions were appropriate, i.e., that
the people excused were the ones who should have been. 6 About
one-third (n = 11) said they either could not understand why some
people were dismissed or felt that it was unfair not to tell people why
they had been excused. As one of these people said: "Am I ugly?
Am I crazy?... They should be able to tell a person." ' 7
Generally speaking, however, just a small minority of people ex-
pressed puzzlement over, or outright criticism of, decisions to excuse
people through the peremptory when defining fair treatment; far
more said that treatment was fair because they felt they understood
why people were dismissed. There was no indication that excused
persons were more likely to make reference to decision outcomes in
defining fair treatment than those selected. Of the thirty-one people
who mentioned this issue, fourteen had been excused.
The remaining ways in which fair treatment was defined con-
cerned the extent to which court personnel were polite and respectful
(n = 46 people), whether questioning was thorough and jurors were
listened to (n = 32), and whether privacy was protected, either by
questioning being appropriate and relevant (n = 21 people) or by
limiting the intrusiveness of public questioning (n = 28).1ls
114. Id. No. 803.
115. Id. No. 303.
116. Of note, these comments were frequently phrased in quite general ways (e.g., "The
decisions seemed all right."). It is conceivable that these people were referring to any decision
about whom to excuse, whether through the challenge for cause or the peremptory challenge.
This means that the number of people who mention issues related to the challenge for cause
could be an undercount.
117. Id. No. 905.
118. The general issue of privacy protection during jury selection, and its relationship to the
peremptory challenge, is discussed in more detail in Rose, supra note 6.
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C. Summary: Being Excused and Issues of Fair Treatment
In sum, this study provides little support for those who worry
that excused jurors will feel that they have been treated unfairly at
the hands of the court. All jurors, including those who had been
excused, had high ratings of fair treatment. Further, in qualitative
comments about fair treatment, only a handful of jurors considered
either the peremptory challenge itself or unfounded dismissals from
the jury as instances of unfair treatment-even though nearly half the
sample had been excused from a trial through the peremptory.
Thirty-one people (15% of the sample) discussed fair treatment in
terms of how judges handled hardship cases, with jurors consistently
expecting mercy towards those whose life circumstances conflicted
with service.
IV. JURORS DEFEND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM AND THEIR OWN
INTERESTS
There are several issues this study cannot address. This project
cannot determine whether decisions about whom to excuse were, in
any objective sense, appropriate. Without access to the true reason-
ing behind the decisions, and without some way to measure how this
group of excused jurors would have viewed the same cases, I cannot
say whether the decisions were discriminatory, wise, unfortunate, or
inspired.119 Second, because I surveyed within a single courthouse, I
cannot determine whether one particular style of jury selection-the
tone, the sequential method, the length of time spent-was responsi-
ble for the views of jurors reported here, or indeed, whether results
are likely to generalize to a wide variety of other jurisdictions and
courthouses. 120 Finally, because I did not interview people prior to
voir dire, I cannot say definitively whether anything about jury
119. For an excellent example of a study that measured how an excused group of jurors
might have voted, see Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 3.
120. It is worth noting, for instance, that under a sequential method of questioning, it is
always evident who is excusing which juror. In a "strike system," in which all peremptories are
exercised at the same time, jurors are more likely to be ignorant not only of the reason for their
dismissal but also of who exercised the challenge. It is possible that jurors in the strike system
would view their outcomes or the peremptory challenge less favorably. However, to date, no
empirical data has examined this question.
[Vol 78:1061
A VOIR DIRE OF VOIR DIRE
selection practices changed the views of those who observed them;
indeed, several competing explanations are possible.21
What this study can do, however, is to systematically document
and analyze the voice of the juror as it pertains to debates about the
peremptory challenge's place within jury selection. In this study, I
spoke with over a hundred jurors who had been dismissed under a
wide variety of circumstances. The current study can indicate
whether excused jurors' reports of their jury selection experience
tended to be positive, negative, or neutral, and, importantly, whether
these views support commentators' fears or optimism. This study
does not suggest that jurors are never upset over being excused, never
resentful toward the court and attorneys, or never annoyed over the
"waste" their dismissal represents in terms of their time or their
talents. There were jurors I spoke to who were quite unhappy about
their time in jury selection.22  However, rather than focusing on
highly memorable trials involving abuse of peremptory challenges,
and rather than privileging encounters with jurors who are disap-
pointed or dismayed over a decision, this study concerns itself with
the views of typical (or average) jurors dismissed from this court.
121. The critics of the peremptory are essentially positing a "harm hypothesis," claiming
that observing jury selection and the use of peremptory damages the legitimacy of the court in
the jurors' eyes. However, a contrasting possibility is that jury selection seeks out and identifies
those who have pre-existing negative views about the courts or other case-related issues-what
might be termed a "bad attitude hypothesis." If the peremptory challenge successfully
eliminates this group of people, it would not be surprising to learn that they view the court in a
negative light because this was precisely the characteristic that contributed to their dismissal in
the first place. Without measuring attitudes prior to jury selection, it is not possible to
determine whether any low ratings of the experience reflect harm or bad attitudes. Two
unpublished studies are suggestive, however. A doctoral student surveyed northern California
jurors prior to voir dire and after service was complete, measuring, among other things, their
views of the court. She found little change in perceptions among those excused, but an
improved view of the court on the part of those who served on a case. This suggests that
excusing people may not harm opinions so much as deny people an opportunity to have a
positive experience that may improve their view of the court. See Paula Consolini, Learning By
Doing Justice: Jury Service and Political Attitudes (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of California at Berkeley) (on file with author). This is consistent with the findings
of an unpublished, court-sponsored survey of southern California jurors done in the 1970s.
Harvey P. Grody, Final Report: Criminal Trial Jury Communication Feedback Project (1976)
(unpublished report, Orange County Office of the Public Defender) (on file with author) ("The
challenge experience has little impact upon the overall distribution of responses to the questions
asking respondents about their general satisfaction with the system."). Of course such results do
not obviate concern about the peremptory entirely, for it is certainly a good thing to provide
people with a positive impression of the court, and one would hope that lost opportunities are
kept to a minimum. However, this type of "harm" may be remedied when people serve on a
case in the future.
122. In discussing his extreme dislike for the peremptory, one juror said, "All they say is,
'See you next year.' You won't see me." Interview, supra note 53, No. 905.
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In this study, jurors reflected on jury selection in four important
ways: (1) they reported why they thought they had been excused; (2)
they provided their post-hoc assessments of their abilities to have
been fair and whether decisions seemed fair and were satisfactory;
(3) they rated their satisfaction with the court, their willingness to
return, and their sense of having been treated fairly; (4) and all jurors
elaborated on what it means for the court to treat jurors fairly. Each
subsection found only mixed-and more often little-support for the
basic charge that jurors who have been dismissed will inevitably
perceive problems with the peremptory challenge will be resentful
and alienated, or will feel ill treated. Although excused jurors ac-
knowledge the use of stereotyping, in general the results suggest a
"generally accepting 123 assessment of jury selection. This acceptance
seems tied to a comfortable recognition of both the adversarial
aspects of jury selection and a view that the proceedings do not
revolve entirely around jurors' particular interests.
In several ways, these jurors seemed comfortable with the idea
that jury selection involves an adversarial element. Based on the
questions posed and knowledge of who dismissed them, the majority
could at least guess why they had been eliminated, and most cited
reasons that seemed to reflect plausible theories about the competing
parties' concerns. Thus, many people expressed a self-awareness of
how they presented themselves during jury selection and that either
their small hesitations or long diatribes on relevant questions proba-
bly alienated one party or the other. Further, in addition to the
twenty-seven people who cited legal experiences as the basis for their
outcome, several of the people in the Personal Characteristics cate-
gory mentioned associations with lawyers or law enforcement.
Attorneys are perhaps wrong to be nervous about the effects of
people's prior encounters with the legal system or their associations
with legal actors-such assumptions may indeed be the results of
unfounded stereotyping' 24-but jurors were nevertheless cognizant
that these issues might make attorneys nervous. Jurors' awareness of
adversaries' pet theories about jurors is perhaps best reflected in the
123. Diamond, supra note 43, at 289.
124. It is always possible that those with knowledge of the legal system will have the most
open-minded and nuanced views, allowing them to entertain possibilities that a given party
might not expect (e.g., that police lie on occasion).
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occasional stories of jurors searching for or anticipating profiling
information that might result in their being subject to a peremptory.'2
But most important, the evidence suggests that (jurors inter-
viewed in this study distinguished between the wisdom of the attor-
neys' decisions and general impressions of the jury selection system.
In the end, people's explanations for their dismissals differed in levels
of support for the decision itself, but in no other way (overall satisfac-
tion with jury selection, willingness to return in the future, or fair
treatment). This suggests not only an awareness of the adversarial
system of jury selection, but also an acceptance of it. Jurors seemed
to realize that jury selection is only partly about them. Such a per-
spective is perhaps best summed up by one juror, who reflected on
the experience of being excused:
I feel all right. I'm just a person like that. Let me explain: If I
brought you a piece of cake, and you didn't want to have it, that's
all right with me. It's OK with me if you want to eat it or feed it to
the dog or whatever. So I feel like I went and offered my services,
and if they don't want them, that's OK with me.
1 26
For the above woman, dismissal from the jury apparently has no
more implication or meaning than discovering that a friend does not
fancy her baking. Her job is to give her time; the attorney's job is to
decide if her time is needed.
The above sentiment also seems consistent with the perspec-
tive-suggested in many ways-that the average person viewed jury
duty as just that: a duty. Ratings of overall satisfaction and willing-
ness to return in the future were not in the highest, most positive
ranges of their scales. This indicates that jury duty was probably not
an activity most would have chosen to undertake on their own. Even
given this, most jurors took their duty seriously. Note how reluctant
the potential hardship cases were to shirk their responsibility outright
and to declare that they refused to even try to maintain fairness and
impartiality. In all likelihood, it is not only psychologically difficult or
embarrassing to refer to oneself as biased, but also may seem wrong
in a moral sense when so many others accept their duty. Even if
plagued by ambivalence or other conflicts, these people wanted to be
good jurors, once again recognizing that the proceedings involve
interests besides their own.
125. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
126. Interview, supra note 53, No. 810. This is the woman who guessed she had been
dismissed because she has sons and grandsons. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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The reality of jury service as a duty may explain why hardship
circumstances were not infrequently cited as examples of fair or
unfair treatment. Elsewhere I have argued that a social exchange of
sorts underlies jury selection, an agreement between citizen and state
that amounts to the following: We come here; you look after our
interests. 27 I have suggested this contributes to the attention people
pay to privacy protection during voir dire because jurors are not in a
good position to protect their own privacy and therefore expect the
courts to take care of this issue.12 The same might be true of serious
hardship conflicts that can arise in jury service, as jurors must depend
upon the courts' compassion for consideration of their difficulties. To
state publicly and explicitly that the court does not care about the
realities of jurors' lives would be inconsistent with protecting jurors'
interests when they are vulnerable. This is not to say that such a
perspective is the correct one, for it ignores the fact that being merci-
ful sometimes violates another fairness expectation-namely, treating
people consistently-when individual circumstances must be evalu-
ated. Nevertheless, this sample of jurors frequently expected mercy
when income or time was scarce for fellow jurors, and instances in
which hardship requests were denied outright seemed to be a salient
issue for this group. Results are only suggestive, but it may be that
jurors are even more sensitive to this issue than to the vagaries of
adversaries' use of the peremptory challenge.
In sum, according to this "voir dire of voir dire," excused jurors
appeared cognizant of the adversarial interests behind peremptory
decisions and were generally at peace with jury selection practices.
Similar to the expectations we might have of people who are selected
for juries, the respondents had clear opinions about the wisdom of
attorneys' and the courts' decisions. Regardless of these views,
however, most described themselves as having been prepared to
sacrifice their own interests to those of the court. In short, if the
peremptory challenge causes harm to the views of those excused, it
was difficult to find it in the voices of this group.
127. Rose, supra note 109.
128. Id.
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